AECL Plutonium test burn and CCRC opposition to the plan

Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County

FACT SHEET

Canada should NOT import weapons plutonium

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and Ontario Hydro are proposing to import U.S. plutonium from dismantled warheads for use in CANDU reactors, most likely at the Bruce "A" Nuclear Generating Station on the shore of Lake Huron. The Canadian government has declared support in principle for the proposal, and has also funded a feasibility study on importing plutonium from Russia for the same purpose.

Hazel O'Leary, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, recently announced that 600 grams of U.S. weapons plutonium will be sent to the Chalk River Laboratories of AECL. AECL's intent is to conduct a "test burn" in their NRU reactor, in preparation for larger-scale future plutonium shipments.

This fact sheet discusses concerns about:

* possible theft of plutonium by criminal or terrorist organizations;

* dangers of creating a global plutonium economy;

* environmental and economic costs of using plutonium as a nuclear reactor fuel;

* the precedent of Canada accepting nuclear waste from other countries; and

* implications for Canada's Nuclear NonProliferation Policy.

Plutonium has many important characteristics:

* it is a very powerful explosive used to make nuclear weapons;

* it is part of the nuclear waste produced by every reactor;

* it is one of the most dangerous manmade poisons known; and,

* it can be used to fuel a nuclear reactor.

When fuel rods are inserted in a nuclear reactor they become extremely radioactive owing to build-up of plutonium and other substances. From the start of the nuclear age, nuclear power advocates have regarded plutonium as the preferred nuclear fuel of the future, and dreamed of "recycling" plutonium from waste fuel rods. "Fast breeder" reactors designed to produce large amounts of plutonium were built in Japan, France, and the U.S.. But serious reactor accidents forced all these countries to terminate or severely curtail their breeder reactor programs.

Extracting plutonium from waste fuel rods is a dangerous and highly polluting activity. During the 1950s, high-level waste reprocessing experiments were conducted at two separate facilities at AECL-Chalk River. Both facilities were shut down after accidents occurred involving major releases of radioactive wastes to the enviroment. These facilities and the wastes leaking from them have never been cleaned up.

A "plutonium economy" would involve serious global security risks, as well as environmental, health and safety hazards. A wellequipped terrorist group could make a powerful homemade atom bomb using only a few pounds of stolen plutonium.

Society stands at an important crossroads. Should plutonium be widely used as a reactor fuel, thus ushering in a global plutonium economy? Or, should plutonium be treated as a hazardous waste and security risk, to be eliminated by ending all plutonium production and isolating and guarding what has already been created to the best of our ability?

Nuclear Disarmament and Plutonium Management

The United States and former Soviet Union have agreed to dismantle thousands of nuclear weapons. The plutonium in these warheads poses the most difficult hazardous waste challenge of our time. In the U.S., the Department of Energy (DoE) has undertaken a review of several options for handling this waste. The U.S. government recently announced that it will proceed with two methods of reducing or disposing of weapons plutonium: "burning" it in reactors, and "vitrification".

"Burning" plutonium involves mixing it with uranium for use as fuel (known as mixed oxide or MOX fuel). MOX fuel is radioactive to start with, but after being "burned" in a nuclear reactor it turns into extremely radioactive waste fuel rods. High-level waste emits penetrating gamma radiation so powerful that it can quickly kill any nearby unprotected human being. Burning weapons plutonium in reactors makes it dangerous and hazardous to handle. This greatly reduces its chances of theft. However, the high-level wastes still have about half the plutonium of the original MOX fuel, mixed with a witch's brew of other radioisotopes.

"Vitrification" of the plutonium involves mixing it with highly radioactive liquid wastes and transforming the mixture into glass or ceramic. This results in a solid waste with hazards similar to that of spent fuel, also deterring theft.

While offering short-term security, neither option prevents future generations from using the plutonium. Over a period of decades to centuries the waste becomes less intensely radioactive, and plutonium again becomes accessible. Plutonium itself lasts for tens of thousands of years it is only very slowly transformed into other elements through radioactive decay.

Global Plutonium Inventory

Eighty percent of the plutonium in the world today is inside the spent nuclear fuel produced by nuclear reactors. France, Russia and Britain reprocess spent fuel in order to chemically separate plutonium from the other intensely radioactive materials in the waste. This is done mainly for military purposes, to obtain plutonium used in bombs. It is also done for civilian purposes, to obtain the plutonium that may eventually be used as nuclear fuel. Twenty percent of the plutonium in the world exists in this separated state. Once plutonium has been extracted from spent fuel it can be stolen, transported, used or stored more easily.

Security Risks

Any wellequipped national or subnational group can make a devastatingly powerful nuclear explosive from just a few pounds of separated plutonium. Because of its toxicity, terrorists could also threaten to spread plutonium in the air in sufficient concentrations to kill many thousands of people. The resulting contamination of large areas would be extremely difficult and expensive to clean up.

Extraordinary security measures would be required to protect plutonium fuel shipments and the reactors used to burn plutonium from terrorist attacks. The cost of these measures has not been disclosed in discussions of the plutonium fuel import proposal. The civil liberties of Canadian citizens may well be seriously eroded by the almost unlimited powers needed by the government to deal with the potential of plutonium theft.

Environmental and Public Health Hazards

Because of the type of radiation (alpha) emitted by plutonium, external exposure does not cause immediate harm. However, inhaling a few milligrams can cause death within months due to severe lung damage. Inhaling even smaller amounts will almost certainly lead to fatal lung cancer decades later. Plutonium is considered to be one of the most carcinogenic manmade substances known for this reason.

Plutonium fuel can `go critical' (undergo a sustained nuclear chain reaction) in certain transportation and handling accidents, such as crushing a container of fuel bundles. Existing studies by AECL and Ontario Hydro do not provide details of this risk, but suggest it be dealt with later. A criticality accident would release large amounts of plutonium into the environment because of its explosive nature.

High level radioactive waste from use of plutonium fuel would become Canada's responsibility, setting a dangerous precedent for the import of other foreign radioactive waste to Canada. An AECL proposal to bury high level wastes at an undetermined location in the Canadian Shield is undergoing a federal environmental assessment at present. Participants in the public hearings reviewing this proposal have noted serious technical deficiencies in it. Although the proposal does not specify a location for the waste burial facility, Canadians face the prospect of nuclear fuel waste shipments through their communities. Also, an unsuspecting Canadian Shield community may end up with a nuclear waste burial site a few decades from now, with no right to challenge the overall safety of the facility.

Plutonium Fuel Feasibility Study

A report by AECL and Ontario Hydro "Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Option", outlining the use of plutonium fuel at the Bruce "A" CANDU reactors, was submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy in July 1994. The cost of the proposal to use plutonium fuel at Bruce exceeds $2.2 billion, not including the extraordinary security measures needed to `harden' the Bruce site against terrorism, or repair of the Bruce "A" reactors. These reactors are nearing 20 years of operation and will soon close without extensive repairs that could cost over $1 billion.

Ontario Hydro hopes a plutonium fuel deal with the U.S. will justify the rebuilding of the Bruce "A" reactors. The nuclear station faces early retirement without the plutonium import deal. The study assumes that the Bruce "A" reactors would operate at 80% capacity for a further 25 years if they were rebuilt, but experience at the previously rebuilt Pickering "A" Nuclear Station does not support this assumption. Ontario Hydro ratepayers may be saddled with multibillion dollar repair costs if the plutonium fuel import scheme is approved.

Canadian Nuclear Policy

Canada's support in principle for the import of plutonium fuel sends a signal to the world that the commercial use of plutonium fuel is acceptable. Commercial trading in plutonium brings with it tremendous environmental and public health hazards and global security risks. Instead of working to eliminate these risks, Canada is helping to initiate the plutonium economy. AECL researched plutonium fuel cycles in the late 70's, and ran a pilot plutonium fuel fabrication plant at Chalk River. AECL recently refurbished its "Recycle Fuel Fabrication Laboratories" and may already be conducting its own MOX fuel experiments using plutonium from unidentified sources.

Canadians have been led to believe that Canada's nuclear industry is not linked to nuclear weapons programs of other countries. The spirit of this nuclear nonproliferation policy may be violated by importing plutonium fuel. Canada's nuclear industry would be integrated into the American nuclear weapons program. The U.S. continues to maintain and upgrade its nuclear arsenals, while dismantling some warheads under disarmament agreements. Canada would be a commercial recipient of plutonium of military origin and would take responsibility for the resulting waste fuel, as well as security measures for the plutonium fuel shipments.

Public hearings into the environmental, public health, security and economic aspects of the plutonium fuel import proposal could be avoided by both Ontario and the federal government. The use of plutonium fuel might be included under a blanket environmental assessment exemption granted to Bruce "A" by Ontario in 1976. Although the operation would also be regulated by the federal Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), the AECB may decide not to hold public hearings under Canada's Environmental Assessment Act. Nor has the AECB indicated that it will make an environmental assessment of plutonium fuel experiments at AECL - Chalk River.

Securing the Future

Civilian stockpiles of separated plutonium are now roughly equal to military stocks globally, and are growing faster. In a plutonium economy, the amount of separated plutonium would continue to increase. The chemical reprocessing done to separate the plutonium from the other spent fuel components generates huge amounts of additional radioactive wastes in liquid form. There are already several tanks of these wastes at AECL - Chalk River. If it is allowed to proceed, the planned commercial use of plutonium will pose much greater threats than the one that society faces today from existing military plutonium stocks.

To increase global security and protect the environment and public health, all plutonium separation should be stopped. Civilian use of plutonium fuel should be forbidden. Existing plutonium should be immobilized and guarded under a strict international security regime. Plutonium should be made as inaccessible as possible for theft or for use as weapons material. The vitrification option should be pursued for military plutonium: mixing it with highly radioactive waste materials and converting the mixture into a form that is hard to access. Political pressure will be needed to stop the production of plutonium worldwide, and research should focus on methods of destroying all plutonium stocks.

Experience demonstrates that commercially traded items eventually end up in the hands of criminals. Once it is separated, plutonium can be handled without elaborate radiological protection. It is highly improbable that plutonium can be separated in a factory; packaged and handled; shipped across continents and oceans; fabricated into fuel; and transported to civilian reactors without any loss or theft.

Take Action Now

Tell the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, that you oppose importing plutonium fuel into Canada. Send a copy to Prime Minister Jean Chretien; to the Minister of Natural Resources, the Honourable Anne McLellan; and your own Member of Parliament > The address for all these people is:

House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0A6 (postagefree).