Backgrounder: The Siting Task Force process - idealism to farce
Executive Summary
The current federal "Siting Task Force on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management" is misusing public funds intended for environmental remediation. By spending most of its $25 million of Green Plan funds on public relations efforts it is blocking effective action on low-level radioactive wastes.
A promising start was made by the original Siting Task Force. It emphasized the need for community decision making and strongly supported long-term waste storage, with an option for retrieval if leaks were detected by monitoring. However, the new "Phase 4" Siting Task Force has rejected waste storage options in pursuit of a politically expedient "permanent solution". The arbitrary rejection of storage options is a serious abuse of the federal environmental assessment process. A biased process considering only disposal options will increase long-term radioactive waste problems and management costs.
The current Siting Task Force should be disbanded immediately and substituted with a public panel review aimed at constructing retrievable storage facilities for wastes in the Port Hope area. Serious problems at the Chalk River property of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. must also be addressed.
Introduction - A hopeful start on a serious problem
The original "Siting Process Task Force on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal" consisted of a 7-member independent panel appointed in December 1987. The Task Force was created largely to deal with wastes from uranium and radium refining operations of the former crown corporation, Eldorado Resources Ltd., in Port Hope, Ontario. Its mandate also included "the disposal of other existing and ongoing low-level wastes located in the province".
In a report entitled "Opting for Co-operation", the Siting Process Task Force noted that "disregard for community concern" had been a serious flaw in previous radioactive waste siting efforts. This problem was well addressed by their new siting process. Potential volunteer communities were provided with detailed information on existing low-level wastes and technologies to deal with them. "Community Liaison Groups" (known as "CLGs") were formed to facilitate the flow of information. Numerous public meetings provided opportunities for airing of local opinions. Communities were free to "opt out" of the process at any time. At the time, this was a positive and innovative approach to dealing with a difficult issue.
The Task Force identified another obstacle to effective action:
A second major factor has been the declared preference of the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) for the concept of permanent disposal as the ultimate acceptable means of handling low-level radioactive wastes. As the federal regulatory agency responsible for the safe management of many radioactive materials, the AECB has thus limited the possibilities for action... One unfortunate aspect of the Board's adherence to this idea is the inhibiting effect it has on the search for simpler solutions, such as long-term storage, that concentrate on improved management of the wastes.
The Task Force recommended that "the concepts of improved management and long- term storage, with the ability to monitor and retrieve wastes, become the immediate objectives for the handling of low-level radioactive waste accumulations". It added that, "This approach encourages prompt action, rather than deferring management improvements in the hope that someday the ultimate "permanent" solution will present itself."
The process unravels
Despite initial participation by over 50 Ontario communities, nearly all these potential "volunteer hosts" opted out by the end of "Phase 3" of the siting process (early 1990). Two communities remained: Geraldton and Deep River. Both had problems. Geraldton lacked land within its jurisdiction suitable for a waste site. The Deep River CLG recommended withdrawing from the process in its final report, citing the lack of a clear rationale for moving the wastes. Their recommendation was overruled by the Town Council of Deep River in a motion submitted by mayor Lyall Smith. His employer is Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL), a crown corporation with a financial interest in finding a "permanent solution" to the low-level radioactive waste problem.
The original Siting Process Task Force was disbanded. A new "Siting Task Force" was created over a year later. Public meetings were curtailed. New CLGs were chosen for the "Phase 4" process and given expensive weekend training sessions on public relations. These focused on overcoming local resistance to the facility. The voluntary nature of the process was de-emphasized in favour of implementing the politically attractive option of placing the wastes on federal land controlled by AECL.
It was announced during Phase 4 that the siting process would completely satisfy the federal government's obligation to conduct an environmental assessment of any facility that might be built. This raises the question, "Who is the "proponent" of this facility?" Is it the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (now called the "Department of Natural Resources Canada"), which houses the Siting Task Force Secretariat? Is it the Atomic Energy Control Board, by virtue of its regulatory powers? Is it AECL, which actively lobbied for a site on their Deep River property during Phase 3 and is a strong proponent of a permanent disposal option?
The designation of the Siting Task Force process as a federal environmental assessment calls into question the decision making authority of local town councils. Are they technically qualified to make a decision which will affect a much larger area than their own jurisdictions, including communities located downstream on the Ottawa River? Can they overrule a recommendation of their own CLGs? Will townspeople have a binding vote in the referendum scheduled at the end of Phase 4? What role, if any, will neighbouring communities have in the final decision?
Confronted with these issues, the Siting Task Force has moved very slowly in giving "unwilling host" communities a voice in the process. In Deep River, the CLG was expanded to include limited representation from neighbouring communities. However,
these communities were denied any effective decision making powers. In general, the original participatory process has been transformed into a series of consultations where communities are presented with a narrow range of options into which they have no input.
The four design concepts being promoted by the federal government for the new facility could be characterized as deep ditch, leaky bathtub, shallow ditch, and surface pile. Although the latter two may be termed as "storage" options, retrieval would have to be done with a bulldozer. All four options appear to be designed primarily to minimize costs. Serious deficiencies of the AECL site - including its fractured bedrock, high earthquake hazard, and proximity to a major river that provides water used by millions of people - are being disregarded in the siting process. If the federal government can not practice good stewardship in dealing with its own wastes, we and our children will be exposed to ever increasing pollution and health hazards.
AECL's waste dumps near Deep River already contain far more radiation than is found in the entire Port Hope area. These leaky dumps were mentioned in the original Siting Task Force documents as candidates for remedial action. Despite its intent to create a new disposal facility at AECL, the Siting Task Force is ignoring AECL's own waste problems in the current process. This serious deficiency is wasting an excellent opportunity for progress in cleaning up the Chalk River site. As a result, long-term decontamination costs at AECL are steadily mounting.
The interests of "source communities" around Port Hope are also poorly served by the current process. The concern of the original Siting Process Task Force that simple waste management improvements would be delayed in a search for an "ultimate solution" has been realized.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Siting Task Force process has failed. The process ignores improved storage and management options and is highly unlikely to provide optimum long-term management strategies for radioactive waste problems. The goal of giving affected communities an informed and effective voice in the process has largely been abandoned in order to obtain a politically attractive "solution".
The current process should be immediately terminated and replaced with a public panel review, whose mandate should be to expedite the construction of retrievable storage facilities for wastes in the Port Hope area. The serious waste problems at AECL Chalk River should also be addressed in an open and honest process.
CCRC/March 1993